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Between 1989 and 1995, 20-plus armed ethnic groups agreed cease-fires with the 
Burmese military government. This year, these agreements are likely to come 
under renewed pressure. 
Since the fall of ex-prime minister Khin Nyunt in October 2004, the situation 
for most cease-fire groups has deteriorated, as they no longer have access to 
the centre of power in Burma. The situation is particularly difficult for groups
such as the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Kachin Independence Organisation 
(KIO), which have publicly challenged the government - including by endorsing 
Burma's inclusion on the UN Security Council agenda. 
Since it reconvened in 2004, 28 cease-fire groups have sent over one hundred 
delegates to the National Convention - although most realise that this process 
is designed to perpetuate and institutionalise military rule. The NMSP, KIO and 
several other cease-fire groups have issued demands regarding the type of 
(broadly federal) constitution they would like to see emerging from the 
convention. In doing so they have sketched the outlines of what a future 
political settlement to "the ethnic question" in Burma might look like. Although
most of their demands have been rejected by the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), in expressing their aspirations the cease-fire groups have 
raised the political profile of Burma's ethnic nationalities. 
With the National Convention drawing to a close, it seems likely that the 
military government will turn its attention to the cease-fire groups. With 
arrangements for a new constitution in place, the government will likely seek to
"regularise" their situation, either by incorporating the cease-fire groups into
state command-and-control structures, as local militias, or by forcing them to 
disarm - as occurred with two groups in Shan State in 2004. Some organisations 
may be willing to settle for a degree of autonomy and restricted political 
participation under the new constitution, which designates six sub-provincial 
administrations. According to this view, any constitution is better than 
continued direct rule by the military: although the space available to ethnic 
nationality and other parties under the new constitution will be very limited, 
it will at least allow them to participate in above-ground politics, from 
"within the legal fold". However, other cease-fire groups (including the NMSP) 
have indicated that they will refuse to hand over their weapons until a 
comprehensive political settlement is reached. 
Probably, Tatmadaw Regional Commanders will be given scope to pick-off 
non-compliant cease-fire groups, as the opportunity arises. Although the regime 
may hope to gain some international credit by taking on organisations associated
with the drugs trade, the most powerful ethnic armies, such as the 20,000-strong
United Wa State Army (UWSA), will probably be left until last. Such 
considerations leave militarily weaker cease-fire groups, such as the NMSP, 
looking vulnerable. 
The cease-fires have resulted in a mixed picture of positive and negative 
developments. Problems associated with the cease-fires are well documented, and 
include the Tatmadaw expansion into previously contested zones, accompanied by 
widespread land confiscation to build new army bases. Also, land has been 
confiscated in the context of "development projects", and under the Tatmadaw's 
self-support policy. Another problem associated with the cease-fires is the 
continuing incidence of forced labour and other rights abuses in areas adjacent 
to cease-fire zones. Most assessments of the cease-fires are produced by 
opposition groups and supporters. These generally underestimate positive 
developments, focusing instead on the many ongoing problems in these troubled 
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regions. The positive aspects of the cease-fire are less widely discussed, and 
tend to focus as much on process, as on the substance of short-middle term 
results. Positive developments include a relative decrease in the most serious 
forms of human rights abuse, in those areas where cease-fires have held. 
Efforts to rehabilitate and resettle displaced populations and reconstruct 
communities have also been a result of the cease-fires. The post-cease-fire 
re-emergence of civil society networks is among the most significant, but 
underappreciated, aspects of the social and political situation in Burma over 
the past decade. For example, local communities have supported programmes such 
as the Mon language and culture courses, conducted over the school summer 
holidays in over one hundred monasteries across lower Burma. 
In response to criticism from the ethnic communities they seek to represent, a 
few cease-fire groups have grappled with internal reform. The NMSP and KIO in 
particular have demonstrated a degree of democratic political culture, 
reflecting their 20 years of participation in pro-democracy alliances, such as 
the National Democratic Front and Democratic Alliance of Burma. 
Policy-making within NMSP and KIO leadership circles usually involves a fair 
degree of debate and disagreement - which has sometimes resulted in damaging 
schisms and splits. Both the NMSP and KIO deserve credit for eliciting public 
participation in decision-making, by consulting with villagers, religious and 
civil society leaders from their communities, regarding whether and how to 
engage with the military government. 
The NMSP is in a particularly difficult position. The three small blocks of 
territory granted to the party under the June 1995 cease-fire agreement are 
vulnerable to Tatmadaw incursion. Neighbouring Thailand, whose security 
establishment helped to push the NMSP into the cease-fire, is unlikely to be 
sympathetic to any resumption of armed conflict in Mon areas. The NMSP has been 
the most outspoken of the cease-fire groups. Indeed, since December 2005, the 
party has refused to endorse the National Convention, sending only a small team 
of "observers" to the forum. Although some activists might like the party to go 
further in its defiance of the government, the NMSP probably can do little more 
without definitively breaking the cease-fire - and bringing humanitarian 
disaster to Mon State. 
The cease-fire groups will soon have to decide whether or not to participate in 
the restricted political space outlined in SPDC's new constitution. In part, 
such decisions will depend on the position of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League
for Democracy. The NMSP's attempt to "sit on the fence" will not be tenable for 
much longer. The party has been dealt a weak hand of cards - but has so far 
played them pretty well (sometimes as much by luck as judgement). While 
retaining relations with the government, the NMSP is the only cease-fire group 
that still enjoys credibility within opposition circles (including most exile 
groups), and remains in contact with its old insurgent allies. 
In 2007 the cease-fire groups are likely to come under renewed pressure from the
SPDC. However it responds, the NMSP deserves credit for having got this far, 
while still preserving its basic integrity. 
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